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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Consider the following canonical patent infringement scenario.  A 
plaintiff owns a patent with one or more claims to the patent’s underlying 
technology.  Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), this plaintiff has the rights to 
manufacture, sell, use, or import the technology delineated by those 
claims.1  The defendant manufactures, sells, uses, or imports what appears 
to be the same technology.  Because the claim language is not entirely 
clear, a judge construes the exact meaning of the claims in a preliminary 
hearing.2  Assuming that the patent is upheld as valid, a jury then 
determines whether the defendant’s device meets the limitations of those 
claims, either literally or equivalently.3 
 
[2] Suppose a device is sold that possesses only the potential to 
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1 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United 
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the 
patent therefore, infringes the patent.”). 
 
2 See generally Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384-88 (1996). 
 
3 Id. at 384. 
 
 





practice some function of the claimed technology.  Perhaps the 
manufacturer has disabled the function at the factory, or maybe 
sophisticated users can modify the device to practice the function.  But the 
device as sold does not actively practice the function.  Call this a “latent 
configuration” of the device, or more simply, a “latent device.”  
 
[3] Common sense precludes an overly literal application of claim 
language.  If a patent claims a “laundry washing apparatus,” a laundry 
machine manufacturer is not excused from liability simply because its 
product does not actually wash laundry until the user turns it on and 
follows the instructions.  For direct infringement, it is enough that the 
infringer manufacture a laundry machine that will wash laundry when 
used—that is, that the laundry machine, as manufactured, have the 
potential to practice the claimed function of washing laundry.4 
 
[4] Nobody seriously disputes that the manufacturer of this laundry 
machine is a direct infringer.  Accused infringers who manufacture 
laundry machines cannot argue that “It wasn’t us, it was the user” any 
more than accused murderers can argue that “It wasn’t me, it was the 
bullets.”  Conversely, if sophisticated users could re-engineer the laundry 
machine to post its activity status to an HTTP server, nobody would hold 
the laundry machine manufacturer directly liable for infringing a patent on 
HTTP communication; it would be contrary to patent law principles to 
assign liability to a use that falls so far outside the scope of a laundry-
washing claim.5  Yet in both examples, the laundry machine has some 
                                                           
4 Alternatively, the doctrine of equivalents allows for infringement by devices that meet 
only an equivalent of the claim language.  But the doctrine of equivalents need not even 
enter the analysis for inventions akin to the laundry machine example.  A device that 
meets a claim element only with user input may fall within the literal scope of that 
element.  See, e.g., Dorel Juvenile Grp., Inc. v. Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., 429 F.3d 
1043, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 
5 The patent described herein is hypothetical, but the nonstandard usage of a laundry 
machine is not.  See Piotr Mitros, Bathroom and Laundry Servers FAQ, MIT, 
http://bathroom.mit.edu/FAQ.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2012). 
 





potential to practice both hypothetically patented functions: washing 
laundry and communicating via HTTP.  It becomes necessary to draw a 
line, separating liability from non-liability, somewhere between these two 
extremes.  
[5] To a large extent, that line is dictated not by any characteristic of 
either the patented or the accused technology, but instead by the language 
of the patent claim at issue.  By virtue of using certain language, some 
claims are what the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“Federal Circuit”) has called “drawn to capability”—they read not only 
on devices that presently perform the claimed feature, but also on those 
that merely possess the capability to perform the claimed feature.6 7  As 
discussed infra, the Federal Circuit has held that when an accused 
invention does not perform a claimed feature, but can potentially perform 
that feature if modified or used in a certain way, that invention directly 
infringes if and only if the claim is a capability claim.8 
 
[6] As this Article will demonstrate, capability claims are heavily 
advantaged over present ability claims in patent infringement suits.  
Recent Federal Circuit case law suggests that if the claim in suit is a 
                                                           
6 Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 994 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (highlighting that “reliance on cases that found infringement by accused 
products that were reasonably capable of operating in an infringing manner is misplaced, 
since that line of cases is relevant only to claim language that specifies that the claim is 
drawn to capability”) (emphasis added). 
 
7 Claims that are “drawn to capability” are referred to here as “capability” claims.  The 
opposite, claims that recite only a present ability, are referred to as “present ability” 
claims.  This language is chosen for simplicity and for consistency with Federal Circuit 
case law.  It is not limited to claims that recite some identifiable “ability”; it applies 
equally well to claims that recite structures or other characteristics, rather than abilities. 
 
8 See Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“Under the precedent of this circuit, however, that a device is capable of being 
modified to operate in an infringing manner is not sufficient, by itself, to support a 
finding of infringement.”); see also Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 
287 F.3d 1108, 1117-18 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 





capability claim, a latent configuration of a device will escape direct 
infringement of that claim only if a structural modification is required to 
perform the claimed functionality.9  Even if the functionality requires 
additional custom-designed physical components; occurs only under 
controlled or contrived circumstances; requires the user to take additional 
undocumented steps; or cannot even be shown to have ever occurred—all 
factors that preclude direct infringement of a present ability claim—the 
capability claim is still directly infringed.  My research did not uncover a 
single Federal Circuit decision that has affirmed noninfringement, or 
reversed a finding of infringement, of a capability claim.  Identifying a 
claim as a capability claim, then, strongly suggests infringement by even a 
latent configuration of a device.  To state bluntly, if a device can be made 
to perform a patented function claimed with capability language by 
anything less than a physical structural modification, that device is on the 
patent law equivalent of death row. 
 
[7] Of course, there exist other powerful predictors of infringement 
besides capability language.  But these characteristics have earned their 
predictive value: through countless applications approved and rejected by 
patent examiners; through years of litigation and appellate case law; 
through formation and enforcement of USPTO policy; through federal 
legislation; through comment and criticism by members of the legal 
community; and through generations of feedback from the marketplace.  
What distinguishes capability language is the degree to which its ascent 
has seemingly escaped those usual checks.  The law governing capability 
language sprung from a meager two sentences on the topic in Intel 
Corporation v. U.S. International Trade Commission in 1991.10  It has 
been shaped implicitly, typically addressed only in passing, by a Federal 
Circuit that likely did not recognize latent infringement as anything more 
                                                           
9 See Finjan, Ltd. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1204-05 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
see also Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  
 
10 See 946 F.2d at 832.  
 
 





than a niche issue.  Legal commentators have allowed that circuit’s 
decisions on the subject to remain largely unscrutinized.  The USPTO has 
been silent on the issue of latent infringement, and the subject is absent 
from both Chapter 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations (“37 C.F.R.”) 
and the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”).  The 2011 
revision of the patent statute, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, was 
all but silent on matters of infringement, let alone latent infringement.11 
 
[8] The inattention paid to latent infringement may not be due to any 
unimportance of the issue, but to the natural degree to which law and 
administration lag behind technology.  Consider how modern software-
driven devices test our notions of capability in ways uncontemplated by 
analog and even digital devices of the last century.  Until the advent of 
recent software innovations like quantum computing, self-modifying code, 
and large-scale distributed systems, it was not unreasonable to assume that 
a device did not possess any particular capabilities beyond those 
contemplated by the design team and installed at the factory.  In other 
words, there was a time not terribly long ago when the Federal Circuit’s 
2010 mental model of software as an automobile engine, with preexisting 
capabilities that are simply turned on or off with an ignition key, was not 
too far off the mark.12 
 
[9] Not only have software capabilities expanded in recent years, but 
the very notion of capability itself has expanded.  Herein lies one danger 
of the current law.  Modern software-driven devices are capable of 
acquiring functionality above and beyond the level at which they left the 
factory.  With distributed systems, that new functionality may come not 
from the designers of the software, but from its users.13  With self-
                                                           
11 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 
12 See generally Finjan, Ltd., 626 F.3d at 1205.  
 
13 See generally ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 121-31 (MIT Press 
2005). 
 





modifying systems, it may arise from the software itself.14  With quantum 
systems, it may be like Schrödinger’s cat: existent and non-existent at the 
same time.15 
 
[10] The patent system is flexible and competent enough to grant, deny, 
enforce, and invalidate patents on these technologies.  But by allowing 
patentees to patent capabilities, without recognizing that the very idea of 
“capability” itself is in flux, the USPTO and the courts have demonstrated 
a troubling lack of foresight.  A patent on a present ability X is closed; it 
reads only on devices that perform function X, or are reasonably capable 
of performing X.  But a patent on a capability to perform some function X 
is open-ended.  It not only reads on all devices that perform X, and on all 
those presently capable of performing X, but also, alarmingly, on devices 
with expandable functionality.  It reads on devices that may later acquire 
some ability to perform X.  It reads on devices that are capable of 
performing an open-ended set of functions that may include X.  It reads on 
devices that invite users to add functionality, where some user may add 
function X.  It reads on devices that nobody knew could be made to 
perform X until litigation arose. 
 
[11] If the technologies underlying the capability claims in the leading 
latent infringement cases—sunglasses, anti-virus software, fantasy football 
—seem mundane and trivial, it’s because they are.16  But capability claims 
on even the most underwhelming technologies can become dangerously 
open-ended as more devices become capable, perhaps accidentally, of 
                                                           
14 See generally JOHN KOZA, GENETIC PROGRAMMING: ON THE PROGRAMMING OF 
COMPUTERS BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION 644 (MIT Press 1992). 
 
15 See generally RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, FEYNMAN LECTURES ON COMPUTATION 191-203 
(Anthony J.G. Hey & Robin W. Allen eds., Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co., Inc. 1996). 
 
16 Cf. Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 563 F.3d 1358, 1369-70 (Fed 
Cir. 2009); Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1117-18 
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 
2001).  
 





performing the patented functionality.  Under current law, it does not 
matter if anyone actually used an accused device to perform a particular 
patented function.  It does not matter if users would need additional 
hardware to do it.  It does not matter if they would need doctorate degrees 
in physics.  It does not matter if they would need to replicate specific 
conditions that the patentee’s expert concocted for litigation.  It does not 
matter if the only way to stop the device from infringing is to remove it 
from the marketplace.  Without more, that device directly infringes the 
capability claim. 
 
[12] In the author’s view, capability claims have not been more 
aggressively pursued by patent applicants, and asserted in litigation by 
patentees, simply because their legal power is too new and unproven to 
have attracted the attention of opportunistic parties.  This Article examines 
why those opportunists might want to take notice.  Part II of this Article 
surveys the current law surrounding the treatment of potentially infringing 
claims.  Part III explores the policy problems presented by that law, and 
Part IV discusses a possible solution.17 
                                                           
17 A note on terminology: Any writer on the subject of patent law faces the challenge of 
communicating clearly without unduly sacrificing the precision that is crucial to the 
subject – especially to the language of a patent’s claims, where small linguistic 
differences can be of critical importance.  When exact terms of art are required to 
accurately communicate the law, this paper endeavors to utilize those terms of art – even 
when doing so results in some awkward phrasing.  For example, I have been careful to 
distinguish between “patented” and “claimed”; claimed “technology” and claimed 
“functionality”; and “abilities” and “capabilities.”  But where a term has no overriding 
legal significance, in the interest of clarity, I have simplified the terminology in use.  So 
this paper will refer to a patented “device”, even though that referent might equally well 
be a system, a computer program, an organism, etc.  It will refer to the party accused of 
infringement as the “defendant,” even though that party might be more accurately be 
described as the claimant in a declaratory judgment proceeding; as the plaintiff in a 
counter-suit; or as the appellant or appellee in an appellate case.  It will refer to that party 
as the device’s “manufacturer” even though it might well be a seller, importer, or user.   
The reason is that the legal principles apply to devices and manufacturers exactly as they 
do to computer programs and users.  This paper primarily concerns direct infringement, 
not infringement by a third party.  Unless otherwise noted, all forms of the word 
 





II.  THE LAW 
 
[13] In Intel Corp. v. U.S. International Trade Commission, the Federal 
Circuit premised liability for a latent configuration of Erasable 
Programmable Read-Only Memories (“EPROMs”) on the claim itself; the 
claim recited “programmable selection means” and “whereby when said 
alternate addressing mode is selected”18 and thus was drawn to the 
capability of a device to practice the patented page mode functionality.19  
The device at issue directly infringed the claim because it physically 
possessed that capability—even though it was not sold to perform the 
patented functionality, and even though users were not told how to 
perform the functionality.20 
 
[14] Adapting the scant two sentences on the matter in Intel, Federal 
Circuit decisions since then have struggled to analyze direct infringement 
by latent devices in a predictable manner.  This section distills those 
decisions into a coherent body of law. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
“infringement” refer to direct infringement.  Lastly, this paper centers on the discussion 
of the legal principles that govern “reasonable capability”, “unreasonable capability”, 
“present ability”, and “latent devices.”  These are terms of art that have not enjoyed 
consistent use throughout the case law.  I have adopted these terms as a way to refer to 
the underlying concepts consistently throughout the paper.  Different sources may use 
different names for the same concepts.  
 
18 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). 
 
19 Id. (finding “the accused device . . . need only be capable of operating in the page 
mode” to be infringing) (emphasis added). 
 
20 See id. 
 





A.  If the claim recites a present ability, rather than a 
capability, to perform a function, then it can be directly 
infringed only by a device that presently has the ability to 
perform that function.  It is not sufficient that the device 
has the capability to perform the function. 
 
[15] High Tech Medical Instrumentation v. New Image Industries, Inc., 
held that a claim of an endoscopic camera “rotatably coupled” to its 
housing did not read on an endoscopic camera that was prevented from 
rotating only by two set screws that could be removed by the user.21  
Rejecting the district court’s analogy to Intel, the Federal Circuit noted 
that while the Intel device as sold literally met the “programmable” 
limitation of the patent claim, the endoscopic camera at issue was not 
“rotatably coupled” without some additional effort by the user: 
 
The [district court] read Intel to mean that if a particular 
device can be altered without undue difficulty to operate in 
an infringing manner, the device, as sold, must be deemed 
to infringe.  Intel does not support so broad a holding.  All 
that was required by the limitation at issue in Intel was that 
the claimed invention, an integrated circuit memory device, 
was "programmable" to operate in a certain manner.  The 
accused device, although not specifically designed or sold 
to operate in that manner, could be programmed to do so; 
that is, it was "programmable" to operate in the designated 
mode.  The claim at issue in Intel therefore read on the 
accused device, as made and sold.  The AcuCam camera, 
by contrast, is not rotatable within its housing unless the 
AcuCam is altered, at least to the extent of removing or 
loosening the set screws that secure the camera to the 
housing.22 
                                                           
21 49 F.3d 1551, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 
22 Id. at 1555-56. 
 





[16] In other words, whereas the claim in Intel only required that a 
device possess a capability—that it be “programmable”—the claim in 
High Tech Medical required that the device possess a present ability—to 
“rotat[e]” while coupled.  The fact that the endoscopic camera at issue 
could be modified to rotate while coupled was irrelevant.  As sold, it 
lacked that ability and therefore did not directly infringe the claim.23 
 
[17] The Federal Circuit has followed High Tech Medical to find 
noninfringement by latent devices.24  Stryker Corp. v. Davol, Inc. held that 
the defendant’s hand-held surgical equipment did not infringe a claim 
requiring “simultaneous suction and irrigation”—a present ability—even 
though the device would perform simultaneous suction and irrigation if 
attached to a specially designed apparatus: 
 
Davol argued that the Stryke-Flow could be modified to 
meet the simultaneous suction and irrigation limitation of 
the '145 patent, or could meet that limitation if it were 
attached to an appropriately designed, newly-fabricated 
probe or an easily modified existing probe.  Stryker 
submitted an affidavit by its Director of Disposable Product 
Development that it does not manufacture, use, or sell any 
control valve assembly, which permits or has been used for 
simultaneous irrigation to and suction from a surgical site.  
In the absence of evidence that the accused hand piece is 
presently capable of permitting simultaneous suction and 
                                                           
23 See id. 
 
24 See Stryker Corp. v. Davol Inc., 234 F.3d 1252, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (granting 
summary judgment of non-infringement to Davol because Stryker’s Stryke-Flow adapter 
did not have the present capability for “simultaneous suction and irrigation” and the 
claimed “second groove” was not present, either literally or equivalently); see also 
Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316,  1332 (Fed .Cir. 2001) 
(finding non-infringement because Plaintiff was “unable to point to any component of the 
accused device which corresponds to the claimed ‘communication means’”). 
 
 





irrigation, the court properly granted summary judgment of 
noninfringement of the '145 patent.25  
  
[18] Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc. concerned a means-
plus-function claim of an apparatus for debiting a pre-paid mobile phone 
credit account.26  Extending the emergent rule of High Tech Medical, 
Telemac Cellular found noninfringement by a latent configuration even 
though performance of the claimed functionality did not require any 
physical modification of the device, which, as sold, contained all of the 
software necessary to perform the functionality.27  The court wrote: 
 
Telemac contends that, even though Topp has chosen not to 
permit direct dialing of international calls, the capability of 
billing for international rates is nonetheless present in the 
phone's source code.  According to Telemac, because 
Topp's system is capable of being modified to place, and 
charge for, international calls, Topp's system infringes.  
Under the precedent of this circuit, however, that a device 
is capable of being modified to operate in an infringing 
manner is not sufficient, by itself, to support a finding of 
infringement. . . . In this case, due to a restriction built into 
the software program stored in the telephone's memory, a 
user of Topp's system is prevented from directly placing 
international calls.  Therefore, international rates, and the 
calculation of charges for such calls, are not included in the 
billing algorithm of the accused device.  The district court 
correctly concluded that Telemac's allegations of literal 
                                                           
25 Stryker Corp., 234 F.3d at 1256-57. 
 
26 Telemac Cellular Corp., 247 F.3d at 1319-20, 1324. 
 
27 Id. at 1330. 
 
 





infringement must fail.28  
 
[19] The Federal Circuit in High Tech Medical did not coin “capability” 
or “present ability” as terms of art; nor did it explicitly identify the claim 
in Intel as reciting a capability, or the claim in High Tech Medical as 
reciting a present ability.  At the time, the court likely did not intend to 
draw any particular dichotomy between the two types of claims.  
However, the Federal Circuit now views High Tech Medical as standing 
for the rule that claims which do not recite capabilities are not infringed by 
latent devices, at least as long as those devices require structural 
adjustments to meet the claim limitations.29  In Revolution Eyewear, Inc. 
v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., discussed infra, the Federal Circuit found direct 
infringement by distinguishing the case from High Tech Medical on the 
basis of claim language, contrasting the present ability claim in High Tech 
Medical with the capability claim in Intel: 
 
The first factual distinction between High Tech and this 
case is clear from the claim language.  The claim in High 
Tech requires a structure: a camera “rotatably coupled” to a 
body member.  In contrast, claim 22 here only requires a 
capacity to perform a function: ‘capable of engaging’ 
magnetic members from the top.  As such, we find this case 
similar to Intel. . . . 
 
The second factual distinction between High Tech and this 
case is [that] the camera in High Tech has to be altered for 
it to be “rotatably coupled” to a body member, while 
Revolution's primary frame does not need to be altered in 
any way for it to be ‘capable of engaging’ magnetic 
                                                           
28 Id. 
 
29 Id. at 1332. 
 
 





members from the top.30 
  
[20] Conversely, in Cross Medical Products v. Medtronic Sofamor 
Danek, Inc., the Federal Circuit found noninfringement by analogizing the 
facts to High Tech Medical and distinguishing them from Intel: 
 
Nor does Intel support a finding of direct infringement.  
The claim at issue in Intel called for a “programmable 
selection means” and thus required only that an accused 
device be capable of operating in the enumerated mode. . . . 
Here, the claim does not require that the interface be 
merely “capable” of contacting bone; the claim has a 
structural limitation that the anchor seat be in contact with 
bone.31 
 
B.  If the claim recites a capability to perform a function, then 
it is directly infringed by a device that is reasonably 
capable of performing that function. 
 
[21] In recent years, the Federal Circuit has expressly applied a more 
charitable direct infringement analysis to claims requiring only capabilities 
than to those requiring present abilities.  While the court has built on its 
1991 finding in Intel that a latent device configuration directly32 infringed 
                                                           
30 Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 563 F.3d 1358, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 
31 Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1311 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
 
32 Later cases affirm that direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. §271(a)—not third party 
infringement under § 271(b) or § 271(c)—is the appropriate framework for analyzing 
latent infringement of capability claims.  See, e.g., Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. 
Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (agreeing with patentee of 
capability claim that the accused product “must be analyzed under a direct infringement 
framework”); see also 37 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
 





a claim requiring that the device be “programmable” rather than 
“programmed,” the court has by 2013 expanded Intel into a rule that 
capability claims are entitled to broad favorable treatment.33 
 
[22] In Finjan Software, Ltd. v. Secure Computing Corp., the Federal 
Circuit spelled out this emergent rule: 
 
As we have cautioned, ‘in every infringement analysis, the 
language of the claims, as well as the nature of the accused 
product, dictates whether an infringement has occurred.’  
Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 
F.3d 1108, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  Accordingly, we have 
held that, to infringe a claim that recites capability and not 
actual operation, an accused device ‘need only be capable 
of operating’ in the described mode.  Intel Corp. v. U.S. 
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  
Thus, depending on the claims, ‘an accused device may be 
found to infringe if it is reasonably capable of satisfying the 
claim limitations, even though it may also be capable of 
noninfringing modes of operation.’  Hilgraeve Corp. v. 
Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).34  
 
[23] In a single move, the Finjan Court thus subsumed three theories of 
latent infringement analysis: (1) the preliminary inquiry into whether the 
claim describes capability, (2) the lower standard for direct infringement 
of capability claims, and (3) the limitation that only devices reasonably 
capable of performing the claimed functionality will directly infringe in a 
                                                           
33 See, e.g., Fantasy Sports Props., 287 F.3d at 1117-18. 
 









latent configuration.35  District courts facing the issue of latent direct 
infringement have since endorsed the Finjan approach.36  And revisiting 
the issue in Typhoon Touch Technologies, Inc. v. Dell, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding of noninfringement without 
changing or even elaborating on its instructions in Finjan.37 
 
[24] But if the Finjan decision was relatively clear about what to do 
with latent infringement cases—determine whether the claim is a 
capability claim, and if so, then determine whether the device is 
reasonably capable of satisfying the claim limitations—it was less clear 
about exactly how to do it.  The court did not elaborate on what precisely 
constitutes a capability, rather than a present ability, or on what it means 
to be “reasonably capable” of satisfying claim limitations.  The Federal 
Circuit has generally failed to provide consistent guidance on how to 
determine whether a claim recites capability or whether a device is 
“reasonably capable.”  Nevertheless, one can draw some general 
observations from the Federal Circuit’s handling of the issue since Intel. 
 
                                                           
35 See id. (citing Fantasy Sports Props., 287 F.3d at 1118; Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade 
Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 
F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 
36 See, e.g., Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 795, 813 (E.D. Tex., 
2011); Versata Software Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-153 CE, 2011 WL 
4017952, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2011); Mikkelsen Graphic Eng'g Inc. v. Zund Am., 
Inc., No. 07-C-0391, 2011 WL 1330782, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 7, 2011).  
 
37 Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 
 





C.  In determining whether a claim recites a capability or a 
present ability, courts may apply the claim construction 
methodology of Phillips v. AWH, interpreting claims first in 
light of the specification and prosecution history of the 
patent, and then in light of extrinsic evidence.  But more 
commonly, courts do not explicitly construe these claim 
terms at all. 
 
[25] The determination of whether a claim recites a capability is a 
question of claim construction to which the Federal Circuit has applied the 
general principles set out definitively in Phillips v. AWH.38  In claim 
construction post-Phillips, ambiguous terms are resolved first in light of 
intrinsic sources—primarily the patent’s specification and prosecution 
history—and then by considering extrinsic evidence only if the intrinsic 
record does not resolve the ambiguity.39 
 
[26] Courts have generally adopted the Phillips methodology in 
determining whether a claim recites capability.40  Typhoon Touch 
Technologies, Inc. v. Dell, Inc. (E.D. Tex 2009) is illustrative.41  The case 
concerned the claim terms “memory for storing”, “memory means for 
storing”, and “processing unit . . . for executing”; the parties disagreed 
                                                           
38 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 
39 See id. 
 
40 See, e.g., Abaxis, Inc. v. Cepheid, No.10-CV-02840-LHK, 2011 WL 3298613, at *2-3 
(N.D. Cal. July 22, 2011); Acer, Inc. v. Tech. Props. Ltd., No. C 08-00877 JW, 2012 WL 
2132408, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2012); Comtech EF Data Corp. v. Radyne Corp. 
No. CV-06-1132-PHX-MHM, 2007 WL 5041159, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 12, 2007); 
Decisioning.com, Inc. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 527 F.3d 1300, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 
41 Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., No. 6:07CV546, 2009 WL 2243126, at *1-2 
(E.D. Tex. July 23, 2009). 
 
 





over whether the word “for” in each of these claims spoke to present 
abilities, or merely capabilities, of “storing” and “executing”.42  Applying 
Phillips, the district court resolved the dispute based on the claim language 
itself.43  In the court’s view, the claims at issue contained limitations 
expressed as functions: “storing” and “executing”.44  Construing “for” to 
require only a capability, rather than a present ability, to perform those 
functions would have effectively read those functional limitations out of 
the claim: “[i]f the claim scope extending to merely a capability ‘to store’ 
or ‘to execute’ was sought by the inventor,” wrote the court, “then the 
claim would have recited only ‘a memory’ and ‘a runtime executor.’”45  
The court thereby construed the claims to require a present ability, not 
merely a capability, to perform the specified functions.  In affirming this 
construction, the Federal Circuit noted that construing the claims to 
require present ability was “in accord with the patentee's statements in the 
specification and during prosecution of the patent application.”46 
 
[27] Typhoon Touch Technologies, Inc. v. Dell, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2011), 
the most recent appellate case on point, demonstrates that construing a 
claim for capability or present ability is subject to the Phillips 
methodology, which authorizes the use of both intrinsic and extrinsic 
evidence, if necessary, for claim construction.47  But the inquiry rarely 
gets that far.  More commonly, courts dispose of the capability 
                                                           
42 Id. at *6-7. 
 
43 Id. at *1, 18-19. 
 
44 Id. at *6-7. 
 
45 Id. at *7. 
 










construction outright based solely on the claim language used.48  For 
instance, in Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc., the district court’s 
construction of “wherein the appliances are provided in a single package” 
as a capability claim was overturned.49  The Federal Circuit merely 
stated—without explanation, though not incorrectly—that “the claims are 
written to require that the devices actually be in a single ‘package.’”50  
Cross Medical Products, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek overturned a 
similar capability construction, stating only that the claim language, “a 
lower bone interface operatively joined to said bone segment and an 
anchor seat portion spaced apart from said bone interface”, recited not a 
capability, but a “structural limitation that the anchor seat be in contact 
with bone.”51  High Tech Medical Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image 
Industries, Inc. was even more opaque on the issue; the court did not 
review any construction of the claim limitation, “rotatably coupled”, but 
simply concluded without explanation that the limitation did not read on 
an accused device that as sold was “not rotatable”.52 
 
[28] The Federal Circuit’s lip service to the capability issue is not 
limited to narrowing capability constructions to require present abilities.  
Finjan Software, Ltd. v. Secure Computing Corp. is perhaps the most 
prominent illustration.  Despite addressing claim language nearly identical 
to that in Typhoon Touch,  decided a year later, the Federal Circuit came to 
                                                           
48 See, e.g., Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 
Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, 424 F.3d 1293, 1311-12 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 
49 Ormco Corp., 463 F.3d at 1307. 
  
50 Id.  
 
51 Cross Med. Prods., 424 F.3d at 1303, 1311. 
 
52 High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc, 49 F.3d 1551, 1553, 
1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 





the opposite conclusion on whether those claims recited capability.53  The 
claims in Finjan, like those in Typhoon Touch, expressed claim limitations 
in functional form, using the preposition “for”: “a logical engine for 
preventing execution”; “a communications engine for obtaining a 
Downloadable”; and “a linking engine . . . for forming a sandbox 
package”.54  But where Typhoon Touch found that such claims must recite 
present abilities, since to do otherwise would effectively disregard the 
functional limitations, Finjan concluded that these claims “cover 
capability,” based on a conclusory finding that the claims do “not require 
that the program code be ‘active’” and that those claims read on 
technology that is “designed to perform an indicated operation, but is not 
necessarily unlocked or active.”55  The court was so confident that this 
was the plain meaning of the claims that it willingly disregarded expert 
testimony—that the term “engine,” as used in the claims, requires present 
activity rather than mere capability—in favor of what it viewed, probably 
in light of Phillips, as the primacy of plain claim language over extrinsic 
evidence.56 
 
[29] In short, the Federal Circuit will apply the Phillips v. AWH claim 
construction methodology to capability inquiries when it explicitly 
considers whether claim limitations need to be construed for capability, as 
                                                           
53 See Finjan, Ltd. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1204-05 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 
54 Id. at 1204-05.  The Finjan patent drafter, indulging the Federal Circuit’s invitation to 
“act as his own lexicographer”, used the term “Downloadable” as a noun to refer to what 
the rest of the world might call a “downloadable software program.”  See, e.g., Process 
Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 
55 Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1205. 
 
56 Id. at 1204.  The Finjan court cited Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. for the proposition 
that “in every infringement analysis, the language of the claims, as well as the nature of 
the accused product, dictates whether an infringement has occurred.”  Fantasy Sports 
Props., Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 
 





it did recently in Typhoon Touch.  But more typically, as in cases like 
Ormco and Cross Medical Products, discussed supra in Part II, whether a 
claim is drawn to capability or present ability is subject simply to the 
court’s gut instincts.57 
 
D. In determining whether a device is “reasonably capable” of 
meeting claim limitations, courts consider whether any 
“structural” modification is required; whether additional 
physical components are required; whether the limitations 
can only be met under controlled circumstances; whether 
the user has to take additional steps beyond ordinary 
operation to meet the limitations; and whether actual 
infringing use by users can be shown. 
 
[30] Once the meaning of claim terms is determined, the accused device 
is compared to those claims to determine whether it meets their 
limitations.58  If a claim limitation only requires a capability, what exactly 
does it take to meet that limitation?  
 
[31] Recall the laundry machine example: if we accept that a 
“capability” becomes a “present ability” with some expenditure of energy 
by the user, then a laundry machine is “capable” of washing laundry and it 
                                                           
57 This Part and the cases discussed herein deal exclusively with apparatus claims.  
Method claims are exempt from the capability/present-ability analysis because method 
claims, by definition, cannot be directly infringed by latent configurations.  Method 
claims are directly infringed only by performing each step of the method, and 
performance of a step by a device, by definition, demonstrates that the device is presently 
able to perform that step.  Thus, if a device lacks present ability to perform all steps of a 
method claim, it does not infringe that claim, regardless of whether that claim purports to 
recite capability.  See generally Sw. Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 
1291 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  Of course, well-drafted patents generally feature both apparatus 
claims and method claims on the same subject matter. 
 
58 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996). 
 
 





is also “capable” of communicating with an HTTP server.  Imagine these 
functions as the endpoints of a capability spectrum.  At one end of this 
spectrum are capabilities that require such trivial user effort to become 
present abilities – such as inserting clothes into a laundry machine and 
flipping the on/off switch in order to wash laundry – that they are simply 
treated as present abilities.  Near that end of the spectrum are “reasonable” 
capabilities, which become present abilities with some small degree of 
effort or input from the user, perhaps assisted by the supplier, and with 
minimal physical modification required.  Toward the other end of the 
spectrum are “unreasonable” capabilities, which only become present 
abilities after substantial modification by the user—modification that may 
require special skills, additional hardware, or a significant amount of time 
and effort.  By allowing latent devices to directly infringe capability 
claims, but only if those devices are “reasonably” capable, the Federal 
Circuit recognizes that it would be unfair to charge unreasonable 
capabilities with infringement or to charge reasonable capabilities with 
noninfringement.59  The difficult question is where to draw the two lines 
on the spectrum: (1) the line separating present abilities (which can 
infringe present ability claims) from capabilities (which cannot); and (2) 
the line separating reasonable capabilities (which can infringe capability 
claims) from unreasonable capabilities (which cannot). 
 
1.  Identifying the Set of Reasonable Capability Devices 
 
[32] Consider the set of all devices.  All devices fall into exactly one of 
the previously defined, and mutually exclusive, claim categories: present 
ability, reasonable capability, or unreasonable capability. 
 
[33] Present ability claims are infringed by present abilities, but not by 
                                                           
59 See High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc, 49 F.3d 1551, 
1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[A] device does not infringe simply because it is possible to alter 
it in a way that would satisfy all the limitations of a patent claim.” (citing Hap Corp. v. 
Heyman Mfg. Co., 311 F.2d 839, 843 (1st Cir. 1962))). 
 
 





reasonable capabilities or unreasonable capabilities.  Therefore, a device 
infringes a present ability claim if and only if it has that present ability.  
Capability claims are infringed by present abilities and reasonable 
capabilities, but not by unreasonable capabilities.  Therefore, a device 
does not infringe a capability claim if and only if it has unreasonable 
capability.  
 
[34] The set of devices that concerns this Article—those that are of 
reasonable capability—is the set of those devices that have neither present 
ability nor unreasonable capability.  Recall that devices that have present 
ability are those that infringe present ability claims, and devices that have 
unreasonable capability are those that do not infringe capability claims.  
Therefore our target set, devices with reasonable capability, is the set of 
those devices that infringe capability claims, but do not infringe present 
ability claims. 
 
2.  Ascertaining the Boundaries of the Set 
 
[35] Recall that only devices with present abilities can infringe present 
ability claims; devices that do not infringe present ability claims presently 
lack those abilities, though they may possess those capabilities.60  Latent 
devices with unreasonable capabilities are those that would directly 
infringe even the claims that are drawn to capability.  Examples from the 
Federal Circuit are hard to come by; when the Federal Circuit identifies a 
claim as a capability claim, it nearly always allows a finding of 
infringement by a latent device.61  Thus, the rule is largely shown by 
                                                           
60 Identifying these devices returns to a question posed earlier: at what point beyond 
flipping the on/off switch and following the instructions, an action that all agree 
constitutes present ability, does a present ability become a capability?  The fine 
distinction at this end of the capability spectrum is beyond the scope of this paper 
because it does not clearly implicate the policy issues raised by the more salient question 
of when reasonable capabilities become unreasonable capabilities. 
 
61 See, e.g., Finjan, Ltd., 626 F.3d at 1205; Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, 
Inc., 563 F.3d 1358, 1370 (Fed Cir. 2009); Fantasy Sports Props., Inc., 287 F.3d at 1119.  
 





negative example: where the Federal Circuit has described a hypothetical 
latent device that would not infringe a capability claim—in order to 
contrast with the actual device in suit found to have infringed that claim—
the noninfringing device has generally required some structural 
modification in order to perform the claimed function.62  A device requires 
such structural modifications if the physical means to perform the function 
are not already present in the device as supplied by the manufacturer.  
Conversely, if the functionality is already physically present in the device, 
then the device is reasonably capable of the functionality and infringes a 
capability claim regardless of what steps the user must take to activate the 
functionality.63 
 
[36] Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc. illustrates 
this rule.  That case involved fantasy football software that could be 
customized by users to alter its functionality—by adding, for instance, an 
ability to track “bonus points,” a feature recited by the claim in suit.64  The 
Federal Circuit stated that the determination of infringement or 
noninfringement rested on whether enabling the ability required the user to 
                                                                                                                                                  
It appears that not even a single example exists where the Federal Circuit found 
noninfringement of a capability claim.  The above cases, in finding infringement, did 
hypothesize such situations. 
 
62 See High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc., 49 F.3d at 1555-56 (noting that a 
manufacturer of a device “designed to be altered or assembled before operation,” unlike 
the accused device, could be liable if the device, when altered or modified, infringes a 
valid patent). 
 
63 See Fantasy Sports Props., Inc., 287 F.3d at 1118 (finding infringement by the accused 
device because the functions already existed and did not require modification of the 
device’s software code, even if the user had to activate the functions); Finjan, Ltd., 626 
F.3d at 1205 (emphasizing that the fact that a user must take steps to activate the function 
“does not detract or somehow nullify the existence of the claimed structure in the accused 
software”). 
 
64 Fantasy Sports Props., Inc., 287 F.3d at 1111-12. 
 
 





“alter the code,” or to just “activat[e] means that are already present in the 
underlying software.”65  The court conceptualized software generally as a 
fixed structure that could only activate functions in response to user input: 
 
Software is a set of instructions, known as code, which 
directs a computer to perform specified functions or 
operations.  Thus, the software underlying a computer 
program that presents a user with the ability to select 
among a number of different options must be written in 
such a way as to enable the computer to carry out the 
functions defined by those options when they are selected 
by the user.  Therefore, although a user must activate the 
functions programmed into a piece of software by selecting 
those options, the user is only activating means that 
are already present in the underlying software.  Otherwise, 
the user would be required to alter the code to enable the 
computer to carry out those functions.66 
  
[37] While this view of software may seem quaint, the court clearly 
conceived two general categories of activating a device’s latent abilities:  
(1) changing some element of the device’s physical structure (here, 
“code”), and (2) configuring or using the device as-is in order to utilize 
some functionality “already present” in the device.67  The court viewed the 
                                                           
65 Id. at 1118.  As Fantasy Sports has been interpreted by later Federal Circuit decisions, 
the court here is saying that it considers the claim at issue to be drawn to capability.  
Otherwise, the distinction between altering the software and merely activating preexisting 
functions in the software would be moot, because neither behavior would result in 




67 Id.  Implicit here is the premise that if activating a function does not require physical 
modification, that function must have been somehow preexistent or “baked” into the 
device.  This premise is demonstrably untrue for modern software.  But for the purposes 
of describing the law, assume, as the Federal Circuit does, that the premise is true. 
 





former category as precluding infringement in the present case, stating: “in 
order to infringe the [patent], the code . . . must be written in such a way 
as to enable a user . . . to utilize the [claimed] function . . . without having 
to modify that code.”68  The court seemingly viewed structurally 
modifying usage by users as dispositive of the unreasonableness of a 
device’s capabilities: “In other words, an infringing software must include 
the ‘means for scoring . . . bonus points’ regardless whether that means is 
activated or utilized in any way.”69  This squares with Intel, which stated 
tersely that the device at issue “need only be capable of operating in the 
page mode,” and that “actual page mode operation in the accused device is 
not required.”70   
 
[38] Finjan, Ltd. v. Secure Computing Corp., which also involved 
software, invoked the logic of Fantasy Sports.  The defendant’s software 
could perform the patented function only if the user unlocked the function 
by purchasing a software key from the defendant.71  The court held that 
the software was reasonably capable of performing that function—and 
thus able to infringe the capability claim in suit—because the relevant 
software module was “resident in the binary source code that is in the 
product,” even if turned off.72  An unreasonable capability, by negative 
inference, is one that would have required some modification of the source 
code or program structure.  The court likened the situation to how “an 
automobile engine for propulsion exists in a car even when the car is 
turned off;” that is, physical or structural components—such as an 
automotive engine, or in the court’s view, computer code—possess 
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69 Fantasy Sports Props., Inc., 287 F.3d at 1118. 
 
70 Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 










reasonable capabilities regardless of whether or how a user engages 
them.73  A capability is unreasonable only if it does not preexist in those 
structural components. 
 
[39] Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. adds the notion 
that functionality may preexist in a device—thereby making the device 
reasonably capable of that functionality—even if the user must combine 
the device with special equipment to activate the functionality.74  The 
issue in Revolution Eyewear was whether eyeglass frames had magnetic 
parts that were “capable of engaging” auxiliary frames, such as top-
mounted sunglasses.75  The defendant manufactured eyeglass frames that 
could engage auxiliary frames only if those frames were specially made to 
fit the defendant’s frames.76  The court nevertheless found reasonable 
capability because the capability to engage auxiliary frames was a 
characteristic of the accused device’s physical structure even though the 
frames could not be so engaged unless the user supplied additional—
indeed, specially designed—components.77 
 
[40] Conversely, when a device requires even the smallest structural 
modification to exercise an ability, courts hesitate to find that the device is 
reasonably capable of that ability.78  In High Tech Medical 
                                                           
73 Id.  The court’s analogy of computer code to an automotive engine lacks technical 
accuracy.  But it is still illustrative of the court’s focus on whether functionality is present 
in preexisting structure. 
 
74 Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 563 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed Cir. 
2009). 
 
75 Id. at 1363. 
 
76 Id. at 1368. 
 
77 Id. at 1369-70. 
 
78 See, e.g., High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc., v. New Image Indus., 49 F.3d 1551, 
1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 





Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Industries, Inc., the endoscope became 
“rotatably coupled” if the user simply loosened two set screws, allowing 
the endoscope camera to rotate.79  Because the claim was not a capability 
claim, the High Tech Medical Court did not hold that the device was not 
reasonably capable of being rotatably coupled.80  However, Revolution 
Eyewear did involve a capability claim, and the court found that the 
device at issue was reasonably capable in part by contrasting it with the 
endoscope from High Tech Medical: “the camera in High Tech has to be 
altered for it to be ‘rotatably coupled’ to a body member, while 
Revolution's primary frame does not need to be altered in any way for it to 
be ‘capable of engaging’ magnetic members from the top.”81  In the 
Revolution Eyewear Court’s view, designing and manufacturing a custom 
eyepiece and attaching it to a device constituted a reasonable capability of 
that device, because the device itself did not have to be structurally 
modified.82  But a capability that required loosening two screws of a 
device was not a reasonable capability, because loosening screws was a 
structural modification to the device, even if a trivial one.83 
                                                           
79 Id. at 1553-54. 
 
80 Id. at 1555-56. 
 
81 Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 563 F.3d 1358, 1370 (Fed Cir. 2009) 
(citing High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc., 49 F.3d 1551).  
 
82 Id. at 1368-70. 
 
83 Formerly, in cases like High Tech Medical, the Federal Circuit considered subjective 
factors such as intent in determining whether capability was reasonable or not.  In High 
Tech Medical, the Federal Circuit apparently felt empowered by a First Circuit case, Hap 
Corp. v. Heyman Mfg. Co., to consider the manufacturer’s intent in determining 
infringement.  High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc., 49 F.3d at 1555 (“‘The question is 
not what [a device] might have been made to do, but what it was intended to do and did 
do. . . . [T]hat a device could have been made to do something else does not of itself 
establish infringement.’” (quoting Hap Corp. v. Heyman Mfg. Co., 311 F.2d 839, 843 
(1st Cir. 1962))).  Accordingly, it considered evidence of the defendant’s design process 
and advertising to determine its subjective intent: 
 





[41] Rearranging or repositioning the parts of a device, rather than 
“reconfiguring” them, does not constitute a structural modification.  In 
Ball Aerosol, the accused device, a candle tin, could perform the patented 
heat transfer functionality only if the device’s cover was placed under the 
candle tin.84  The district court found that the candle tin was reasonably 
capable of this functionality, and that rearranging the parts of the candle 
tin was not a structural modification like loosening the set screws in High 
Tech Medical: 
 
The alterations in question in High Tech involved actually 
removing screws from a camera and reconfiguring the 
product . . . . In contrast, in the instant action, the act of 
placing the Accused Candle Tin's removable cover under 
the holder as a base requires absolutely no physical 
alteration of any aspect of the Accused Candle Tin.85 
  
                                                                                                                                                  
 
New Image did not design the AcuCam camera to rotate within its 
housing during operation; nor was there any reference to the rotation of 
the camera in the AcuCam promotional materials that were made part 
of the record.  In addition, it does not appear from the record that 
removing the set screws would serve any functional purpose not 
already accomplished by other means . . .  
 
High Tech Med. Instrumentation, 49 F.3d at 1556.  It may have derived its rule of law 
from Intel, but by considering the defendant’s intent in determining reasonable capability, 
the court in High Tech Medical seemingly overlooked Intel’s reminder that “there is no 
intent element to direct infringement.”  Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 
821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing to 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)(c)).  Cases since High Tech 
Medical have rectified the situation by properly excluding subjective factors from direct 
infringement analysis.  
 
84 Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 995 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
 
85 Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., No. 05-cv-3684, 2006 
WL 6178978 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2006). 
  
 





[42] Recall that reasonable capabilities of a latent device are those that 
result in the infringement of a capability claim, but noninfringement of a 
present ability claim.  In the four capability infringement cases discussed 
in the previous section—Fantasy Sports, Finjan, Intel, and Revolution 
Eyewear—infringing devices had characteristics that suggested 
noninfringement: (1) additional physical components were required to 
activate the claimed ability (Revolution Eyewear); (2) the claimed ability 
could only be activated under controlled circumstances (Fantasy Sports); 
(3) the user had to take specific additional steps to activate the claimed 
ability (Finjan); and (4) device users’ actual infringing use could not be 
shown (Intel).86  Nonetheless, in other cases involving present ability 
claims, these same characteristics are found on the devices that were found 
to not infringe the claims.87  These four characteristics therefore suggest 
that a device is reasonably capable of performing a particular function, but 
not presently able to perform that function.  Each characteristic is 
examined in turn. 
 
i.  Additional Physical Components Required 
 
[43] In Revolution Eyewear, the defendant’s eyeglass frames were 
“capable of engaging” auxiliary frames even though those auxiliary 
frames had to be specially designed for the task.88  So long as the accused 
frames themselves did not have to be modified, the custom hardware 
required for practicing the ability did not constitute unreasonable 
capability.89 
                                                           
86 See supra text accompanying notes 20, 66, 71, 74.  
 
87 See, e.g., High Tech Med. Instrumentation, 49 F.3d at 1555-56; Nat’l Instruments 
Corp., v. Mathworks, Inc., 113 Fed. App’x. 895, 898-99 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 











[44] Stryker Corp. v. Davol Inc. was a different story.  The Federal 
Circuit held that the defendant’s hand-held surgical equipment did not 
infringe a claim requiring “simultaneous suction and irrigation”—a 
present ability—even though the device would perform simultaneous 
suction and irrigation if attached to a specially designed apparatus: 
 
Davol argued that the Stryke Flow could be modified to 
meet the simultaneous suction and irrigation limitation of 
the 145 patent, or could meet that limitation if it were 
attached to an appropriately designed, newly-fabricated 
probe. . . . In the absence of evidence that the accused hand 
piece is presently capable of permitting simultaneous 
suction and irrigation, the court properly granted summary 
judgment of noninfringement of the '145 patent.90 
 
[45] Revolution Eyewear and Stryker involved accused devices that 
were similar because they could only exhibit the claimed functionality if 
attached to a specially designed piece of hardware.91  But where 
Revolution Eyewear involved a capability claim, the claim in Stryker was 
a present ability claim.92  Because this single salient difference was 
determinative, the requirement of additional physical components suggests 
a finding of reasonable capability. 
 
ii.  Controlled Circumstances Required 
 
[46] The fantasy football program in Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. 
provided a mechanism by which users could customize how the program 
                                                           
90 Stryker Corp. v. Davol Inc., 234 F.3d 1252, 1257 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 
91 Id; see also supra text accompanying notes 74. 
 









would compute football scores.93  The patentee’s expert was able to 
customize the program in such a way that it would award “bonus points,” 
thereby meeting the limitations of the claim in suit.94  The court was not 
persuaded by the defendant’s appeal to the principle that “[t]hat a device is 
capable of being modified to operate in an infringing manner is not 
sufficient, by itself, to support a finding of infringement.”95  Rather, the 
court asserted the primacy of the claim language: “the language of the 
claims, as well as the nature of the accused product, dictates whether an 
infringement has occurred.”96  That is, if the claim language recites a 
capability, rather than a present ability, then evidence that a device is 
capable of operating in an infringing manner—even if only under 
controlled or non-standard circumstances—may be sufficient to show 
infringement.  The court considered claim language, such as “means for 
scoring . . . bonus points”, to be drawn to capability; as long as the user 
was simply “activating means that are already present in the underlying 
software,” that could constitute a showing of reasonable capability.97 
 
[47] Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp. demonstrates the corollary: if the claim 
at issue is a present ability claim, then it is not sufficient to show 
infringement only under controlled or non-standard conditions.98  The 
                                                           
93 Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
 
94 Id. at 1117.  
 
95 Id. at 1117-18 (quoting Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 
1330 (Fed .Cir. 2001)).  
 
96 Id. at 1118. 
 
97 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 
98 See 79 F.3d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 
 





claim in Zygo involved a particular means of aligning interferometers.99  
The accused device could only meet a particular present ability claim 
limitation, “an alignment reticle integral with the screen,” if the device 
was misadjusted, resulting in a visible alignment reticle.100  The court 
rejected the patentee’s argument, based on Intel, that “a device which is 
capable of infringing use does not escape infringement although not 
actually used in an infringing manner.”101  It clarified that this principle 
only applies to capability claims such as that at stake in Intel.102 
 
[48] The Federal Circuit’s stance in Zygo has been reiterated in other 
cases involving present ability claims.103  Accordingly, that a device 
becomes able to perform a claimed function only under controlled 
circumstances correlates with a finding of reasonable capability. 
 
                                                           
99 See id. at 1566.  See generally R. W. DITCHBURN, LIGHT 321-58 (Academic Press Inc., 
3d ed. 1976) (An interferometer is an optical device, requiring precise calibration, for 
making precision measurements using waves of light). 
 
100 Zygo Corp., 79 F.3d at 1569-70 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 





103 See, e.g., Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“[O]ur cases have rejected claim constructions that would merely require that infringing 
devices be capable of being modified to conform to a specified claim limitation”); 
Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (refusing to 
find a device would directly infringe a product claim simply because the device could be 
modified to render it infringing); Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, 
Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting patentee’s argument that “to directly 









iii.  Additional Steps Required 
 
[49] Some devices only exhibit claimed functionality if the user 
performs additional steps beyond those ordinarily required to operate the 
device, or performs some non-structural modification of the device.104  In 
Finjan, the software module capable of exhibiting the claimed 
functionality was disabled by the manufacturer, and was unlocked only if 
the user purchased a software key from the manufacturer at an additional 
cost.105  The defendant argued that locked or disabled features were 
noninfringing and pointed to ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks 
Manufacturer Co., Ltd., involving physical lock-and-key mechanisms, 
where the Federal Circuit overturned a finding of infringement because the 
accused device could “be used at any given time in a noninfringing 
manner.”106  The accused locks in ACCO could perform the patented 
locking functionality only if the user operated the locks in a particular 
fashion.107  Finding infringement, the Federal Circuit in Finjan expressly 
distinguished ACCO from the present case because ACCO involved 
present ability claims, while Finjan involved capability claims: 
 
[I]n ACCO Brands, the claim language required the locking 
device's pin to extend through a slot in a specific 
configuration.  Here, by contrast, Finjan's apparatus claims 
do not require that the proactive scanning software be 
configured in a particular way to infringe—only that it be 
programmed for performing the claimed steps . . . . The fact 
that users needed to ‘activate the functions programmed’ by 
                                                           
104 This is so-called “soft” modification of the device. 
 
105 See Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 
106 Id. at 1203-04; see also ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 
1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 
107 See ACCO Brands, 501 F.3d at 1310-11. 
 
 





purchasing keys does not detract from or somehow nullify 
the existence of the claimed structure in the accused 
software.108 
 
[50] Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc. provides another 
example of additional user steps rendering a device incapable of 
infringing a present ability claim.109  Like Finjan, Telemac Cellular 
also required the user to undertake additional steps—again, to unlock a 
particular software module—to make the accused device, a prepaid 
mobile phone, perform the claimed functionality of billing for 
international telephone calls.110  The court did not contest that “the 
capability of billing for international rates is . . . present in the 
[accused] phone's source code,” or that the accused phone was 
“capable of being modified to place, and charge for, international 
calls.”111  Nevertheless, it affirmed the district court’s finding of 
noninfringement because in order to perform international billing, the 
user had to provide the phone with an international billing rate.112  
Providing the device with an international billing rate is not 
substantially different from purchasing a software key from the 
manufacturer in Finjan.  Both merely provide means to activate 
functionality that already exists in the software.  The salient difference 
between the two cases is that Telemac Cellular involved a present 
ability claim,113 whereas Finjan involved a capability claim.114  The 
                                                           
108 Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1204-05 (internal citations omitted). 
 
109 247 F.2d 1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 
110 See id. at 1320-21. 
 




113 The court stated that “[u]nder the claim as properly construed, the accused device 
must store an international rate in its memory,” and that “[t]he accused device must also 
 





cases thus suggest that if a device requires the performance of 
additional steps to exhibit a particular functionality, the device likely is 
reasonably capable of that functionality. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
calculate charges to be debited from the account amount using that rate.”  Id. at 1331 
(emphasis added).  The emphasized language clearly identifies this claim as a present 
ability claim. 
 
114 See supra text accompanying note 53.  The Federal Circuit also seemingly found 
noninfringement of the Telemac Cellular claim on other grounds: that because modifying 
the phone to bill for international calls required supplying the phone with an international 
billing rate which did not preexist in the phone’s firmware, the modification of the device 
was a structural one.  Recall that structural modifications render devices noninfringing of 
even a capability claim.  Telemac Cellular, 247 F.3d at 1332.  But after Fantasy Sports, 
this reasoning is no longer good law.  The current view, under Fantasy Sports, Finjan, 
and Revolution Eyewear—all of which post-date Telemac Cellular—is that structural 
modifications are those that supply the device with new functionality it did not ship with.  
See supra Part II.D.1.  Supplying the Telemac Cellular device with a billing rate is not 
adding functionality; it is merely providing the device with a data value that the 
preexisting billing functionality needs to operate.  This is no different than the user 
customization of football scoring methods in the Fantasy Sports software, where the user 
merely had to input data to set the desired scoring parameters, and the software would 
translate that data into scoring methods.  See Fantasy Sports Props. Inc., v. 
Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  By ruling that that 
customization was merely “activating means already present in the underlying software,” 
rather than structurally modifying the software, Fantasy Sports supersedes the 
inconsistent finding in the earlier Telemac Cellular.  Id. at 1118.  In any case, the 
Telemac Cellular court’s view, that simply supplying a device with any data that does not 
already exist in its firmware constitutes a structural modification, is flatly unworkable 
because it would create a loophole for any computer program that takes user input.  All 
user input to a computer program supplies that program with data that did not already 
exist in the program’s code.  Ordinary operation of any interactive software involves 
some degree of user input; classifying any such operation as structural modification 









iv.  No Evidence of Actual Infringing Use 
 
[51] In many accusations of direct infringement by a latent device, 
actual infringing use by any user cannot be demonstrated.  Intel was the 
first to say that for capability claims, actual infringing use is irrelevant.  
Rejecting the accused manufacturer’s defense that the patentee could not 
show that even a single user had used its device in the infringing page 
mode—or, indeed, was even aware that the device could be made to 
operate in that mode—the court stated that because the claim is a 
capability claim, “the accused device, to be infringing, need only be 
capable of operating in the page mode. Contrary to [defendant’s] 
argument, actual page mode operation in the accused device is not 
required.”115  Later cases involving capability claims have been consistent 
with Intel.116 
 
[52] But cases involving present ability claims, rather than capability 
claims, are treated differently.  These cases require that patentees 
demonstrate users’ actual infringing behavior.117  ACCO Brands provides 
a ready example; the accused lock in that case was found noninfringing 
because there was no evidence of actual infringing use.118  The accused 
                                                           
115 Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 
116 See, e.g., Fantasy Sports, 287 F.3d at 1118 (noting “an infringing software must 
include the ‘means for scoring . . . bonus points’ regardless whether that means is 
activated or utilized in any way”); Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 
1197, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Finjan's apparatus claims do not require that the proactive 
scanning software be configured in a particular way to infringe”); Revolution Eyewear, 
Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 563 F.3d 1358, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“It is irrelevant that 
[the auxiliary frames made available to users] are not actually used in a top-mounting 
configuration or cannot be so used”). 
 











lock was capable of operating in infringing and noninfringing modes, but 
the patentee did not put forth evidence that anyone other than its own 
expert had actually used the lock in the infringing mode.119  And unlike in 
Intel, the court thought it relevant that instructions on operating the device 
in the infringing mode were not provided to users.120  Ball Aerosol & 
Specialty Container—involving a candle holder, as discussed above—
came out similarly.  Citing ACCO, the Federal Circuit explained: 
 
BASC concedes that it has no proof that the Travel Candle 
was ever placed in the infringing configuration, and it is 
clear that the Travel Candle does not necessarily have to be 
placed in the infringing configuration.  We thus reverse the 
district court's finding of infringement, and we remand to 
the court with instructions to issue a summary judgment of 
noninfringement.121 
 
[53] Because evidence of actual infringing use of a device is required 
for infringement of a present ability claim, yet irrelevant to infringement 
of a capability claim, such evidence suggests the device’s reasonable 
capability to perform a claimed function. 
 
III.  THE PROBLEM 
 
A.  The Patent Office Problem 
 
[54] USPTO examiners, tasked with granting or denying patent 
                                                           
119 Id. at 1313.  The court suggested that witness testimony of actual device users, or 
surveys of the defendant’s customers, would have been persuasive.  See id. 
 
120 See id. at 1311. 
 









applications in accordance with the requirements of Title 35 of the U.S. 
Code, act as gatekeepers to the patent system.  They are subject to limited 
review outside of the USPTO’s own internal appeals process; under the 
2011 ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. 
Partnership, Article III judges can invalidate the USPTO’s decision to 
grant a patent only when error is shown by clear and convincing 
evidence.122  Gatekeepers fail when they let unwelcome visitors through 
the gate—or in the patent context, when they grant patents to inventors 
who do not fully comply with the Title 35 requirements. 
 
[55] With the understanding that the Federal Circuit has given broad 
scope to capability claims, the USPTO gatekeepers have failed by 
allowing at least some of those claims into the patent system.  Under 
current law, capability claims are potentially infinite in scope, 
encompassing any device that can perform the claimed function without 
structural modification.  Title 35 has checks against claims of such scope; 
35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that the patent specification contain a written 
description sufficient to enable persons of ordinary skill in the relevant art 
to practice the claimed invention.123  When the claimed invention is 
actually a class of invention—as with capability claims, which effectively 
claim all such devices capable of performing a function—the enablement 
and written description requirements apply to the entire class.124  That is, it 
is not enough under § 112 to enable and describe some subset of the class.  
The patent specification must teach the entire set.  To illustrate, imagine a 
patent that claimed “vehicles comprising four wheels.”  To obtain 
exclusive rights to all vehicles with four wheels, it would be insufficient 
for the patent specification to teach just cars; just cars, trucks, and buses; 
                                                           
122 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). 
 
123 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).  See generally In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 
1993).  
 
124 See 35 U.S.C. § 112.  
 
 





or perhaps even all presently known vehicles that possess four wheels.  
The patent must enable those skilled in the art to practice the entire set of 
vehicles with four wheels, even if the boundaries of that set are not 
fixed.125  The patent’s teachings must be drawn to the four-wheeled nature 
of four-wheeled vehicles, not simply to individual vehicles that possess 
four wheels.126 
 
[56] Consider the scope of capability claims in light of this principle.  If 
a patent claims a device with a capability, it is not sufficient under § 112 
that the patent teach individual devices with that capability—regardless of 
how many such devices it teaches.  Section 112 requires that the 
specification enable those skilled in the art to practice all such devices 
with that capability, and thus that it teach the capability itself.127  Evidence 
that the USPTO has violated this principle in granting capability claims 
                                                           
125 See LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (holding that “the description of one method for creating a seamless DWT [did] not 
entitle the inventor of the [patent] to claim any and all means for achieving that 
objective”). 
 
126 This is not to be confused with the argument, roundly rejected by the Federal Circuit, 
that a patent ought to be invalidated for not enabling technology that was not yet 
discovered at the time of filing.  See, e.g., Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001) 
(“Enablement is determined from the viewpoint of persons of skill in the field of the 
invention at the time the patent application was filed.”).  Patents that claim a category 
while only enabling a subset of that category are not non-enabling only when some later 
development enlarges the scope of that category; they are non-enabling because they do 
not enable persons skilled in the art to practice the category even as of the time of filing. 
 
127 See 35 U.S.C. § 112; In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting when a 
claim “covers every conceivable means for achieving the stated result, while the 
specification discloses at most only those means known to the inventor . . . the claim is 
properly rejected . . . on the first paragraph of § 112”). 
 
 





can be found right in the seminal Federal Circuit cases on the subject.128  
For instance, claim 22 of U.S. patent RE37,545, asserted in Revolution 
Eyewear, claimed eyeglass frames with a pair of “first magnetic members 
capable of engaging second magnetic members of an auxiliary spectacle 
frame.”129  This claim is an easy target because the word “capable” 
appears right in the claim language, so the patent examiner cannot be 
accused of mistaking this for a present ability claim.  Predictably, the 
patent specification describes the inventor’s eyeglass frames, which 
include a pair of magnetic members.130  Those particular magnetic 
members are presently able to engage “second magnetic members of an 
auxiliary spectacle frame.”131  That is, the patent claims the set of eyeglass 
frames that contain a pair of magnets and are capable of engaging a 
second pair of frames.  However, the specification only teaches one 
member of that set: eyeglass frames that contain a pair of magnets that are 
presently able to engage the second pair of frames.  The specification does 
not teach any sort of magnetic arrangement that is capable of engaging a 
second pair of frames, but is not presently able to do so.  To the extent that 
such an arrangement exists, this claim fails the enablement and written 
description requirements because it reads on a capability, yet only teaches 
a present ability. 
 
[57] The novelty requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102—which bar 
patentability if, among other things, the subject matter was previously 
“known or used by others in this country”—also provide a check against 
                                                           
128 See generally Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 563 F.3d 1358, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 
Typhoon Touch Tech., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376 (Fed Cir. 2011). 
 
129 U.S. Patent No. RE37,545 col. 6 l. 56-58 (filed Nov. 7, 1995). 
 
130 Id. at col. 1 l. 45-55. 
 
131 Id. at col. 6 l. 57-58. 
 
 





overbroad capability claims.132  A principle of novelty is symmetry 
between infringement and anticipation under § 102; if a patent would read 
on an invention for infringement purposes, that invention anticipates the 
patent if it pre-dates its invention.133  Under current law, a patent that 
claims a capability to perform a function reads on any device that can be 
made to perform that function without structural modification.134  Any 
such device, then, should be invalidating prior art under the symmetry 
principle if it existed before the invention underlying the patent.135 
[58] Consider the possibility of Section 102 error by the USPTO in 
granting claim 65 of U.S. Patent 6,092,194, which was successfully 
asserted against a latent device in Finjan.136  Claim 65 recites a 
“computer-readable storage medium storing program code for causing a 
server that serves as a gateway to a client to perform the steps of: 
receiving . . . ; comparing . . . ; and preventing execution”.137  The Federal 
Circuit held in Finjan that the “receiving,” “comparing,” and “preventing 
execution” steps were drawn to capability and that the claim thus read on 
                                                           
132 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 
133 See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
("[T]hat which infringes if later anticipates if earlier.”) (quoting Peters v. Active Mfg. 
Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
134 35 U.S.C. § 102; Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“When a claim 
covers several structures or compositions, . . . the claims is deemed anticipated if any of 
the structures or compositions within the scope of the claim is known in the prior art.”). 
 
135 Or, once the Leahy-Smith legislation takes effect, if it merely pre-dates the filing date 
of the patent application.  Leahy-Smith is not discussed in detail here.  As applied to 
latent devices, it does not significantly change the principles of novelty, only its timing.  
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be 
codified as 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012)). 
136 See generally Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1204, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 
2010).  
 









any device with software that had the potential to perform those steps—
even if the software was not presently able to do so.138  This broad 
definition encompasses any device that can be non-structurally modified 
to perform those functions.  But such devices pre-date the patentee’s 
invention, and were even cited as references in the ‘194 patent 
application.139  Consider, for example, U.S. Patent 5,832,208, covering an 
anti-virus system for use with databases and mail servers.140  Unlike the 
anti-virus system in ‘194, the system in the ‘208 patent lacks the present 
ability to “receive,” “compare,” and “prevent execution” of 
“Downloadables”.  But the ‘208 system could be trivially modified to 
perform these functions without any structural modification of the code 
itself.  Because the Federal Circuit held that ‘194 claim 65 reads on 
systems like that in the ‘208 patent, it follows that ‘208 should have been 
prior art invalidating ‘194 claim 65.141 
 
[59] Overbroad patents claiming capabilities of eyeglass frames or anti-
virus software may not be particularly alarming.  But the problem is that 
the USPTO’s errors in the Revolution Eyewear and Finjan patents are 
commonplace.  In a search of recent patents containing capability claims, 
the author was unable to locate even a single patent that appeared to 
genuinely enable a capability rather than merely a present ability, or that 
                                                           
138 See Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1205. 
 
139 See ‘194 Patent (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,832,208 (filed Sept. 5, 1996) [hereinafter 
‘208 Patent]). 
 
140 See ‘208 abstract.  The ‘208 patent issuance date pre-dates the ‘194 date by nearly two 
years; the ‘194 application cited ‘208 as a reference; and the ‘194 applicant did not 
attempt to swear behind the ‘208 patent.  There is no evidence suggesting that the ‘194 
invention may have been invented before the ‘208 invention.  Compare ‘208 Patent 
(issued Nov. 3, 1998), with ‘194 Patent (issued July 18, 2000). 
 
141 Finjan, 626 F. 3d at 1205.  
 
 





carved out an exception for prior art that also possesses that capability.142  
In capability claims that do not use a form of the word “capable”—for 
example, the “engine for preventing execution” capability claim in 
Finjan—the risk of this error is even higher because the examiner may or 
may not recognize the claim as a capability claim.  Further, with no 
mention of capability claims in the Code of Federal Regulations or in the 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, the USPTO has not indicated any 
awareness of the issue, let alone made an attempt to bring it to the 
attention of its examination staff or of the patent bar.  Compounding the 
problem is that after i4i, courts cannot invalidate USPTO errors that 
cannot be shown by clear and convincing evidence—an evidentiary 
burden that may be impossible to meet in the case of claim language that 
the Federal Circuit has not specifically identified as being either capability 
language or present ability language.143 
 
B.  The District Court Problem 
 
[60] District courts have the ability to invalidate wrongfully granted 
patent claims and to construe ambiguous claim terms,144 but must of 
course do so in accordance with mandates from the Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court.  The Federal Circuit’s instructions for claim construction 
limit the flexibility that district courts have in narrowing overbroad claim 
terms, and its determinations of claim capability in cases such as Finjan, 
Typhoon Touch, and Revolution Eyewear may bind district courts facing 
claim language that cannot be distinguished from the claims in those 
                                                           
142 Admittedly this was a rather cursory search, due to the time-intensive nature of 
scrutinizing patents for §112 violations.  But a large sample size is not needed to 
demonstrate that the risk of the USPTO granting overbroad capability claims is not 
hypothetical. 
 
143 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2250 (2011). 
 
144 Cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1990) (noting the 
district judge’s role in construing the claim terms in issue). 
 
 





cases.  For its part, the Supreme Court has enhanced the level of deference 
that the courts must give to determinations of the USPTO, allowing courts 
to invalidate patents only on clear and convincing evidence of error.145  
Thus, even if a court recognizes that a claim in suit may be overbroad due 
to capability, that court may be unable to meaningfully address that 
overbreadth. 
 
[61] Construction of patent claims is a question of law under Markman, 
and Phillips v. AWH is the standard by which district courts engage in 
claim construction.146  Phillips instructs courts to construe claims in 
context: first by examining intrinsic sources, such as the patent 
specification and prosecution history, and then by admitting extrinsic 
evidence only if intrinsic evidence is insufficient.147  But the Federal 
Circuit also instructs not to import limitations from the patent specification 
into the claims.148  If claim terms are unambiguous or undisputed, courts 
frequently apply the plain meaning of those terms without using the 
specification or prosecution history to divine the meaning that the patentee 
intended for those terms.149  As an example, the court in Revolution 
Eyewear found the claim language “capable of engaging” to be 
unambiguously drawn to capability and did not attempt to construe the 
claim in light of the specification.150  If a court faces a claim of “devices 
                                                           
145 See Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2250. 
 
146 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 391; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1333 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Lourie, J., concurring). 
 
147 See generally Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314-17. 
 
148 See, e.g., Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
 
149 Id.; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13. 
 









capable of performing X”, then, that claim plausibly lacks ambiguity 
under Revolution Eyewear.  Thus, courts may simply construe such a 
claim as an unambiguous capability claim—even if the specification and 
prosecution history, if considered, would demonstrate that a capability 
construction does not accurately reflect the patentee’s invention.  
 
[62] District courts more freely apply the Phillips methodology when 
construing claims that do not contain some form of the word “capability.”  
These claims are more ambiguous as to whether they describe capabilities 
or merely present abilities, so courts more readily interpret the claim 
language in light of the intrinsic record.  To illustrate, Finjan and Typhoon 
Touch both involved disputed claims with similar language: a claim in 
Finjan recites a “logical engine for preventing execution”, and a claim in 
Typhoon Touch recites “memory for storing”.151  However, the Federal 
Circuit found in Finjan that “for preventing” recited capability.152  And 
Typhoon Touch, acknowledging the ambiguity of the claim language, 
examined the specification and prosecution history of the patent-in-suit to 
conclude that “for storing” recited a present ability.153  After Typhoon 
Touch, similar functionally-drawn claims can fairly make a case for the 
ambiguity of their terms, encouraging district courts to apply the Phillips 
methodology to determine capability or present ability in light of the 
intrinsic record.  Nonetheless, the problem remains: district courts that 
grant capability constructions without scrutiny, and without considering 
the intrinsic record, create a risk of unduly enforcing overbroad claims. 
 
                                                           
151 Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotations omitted); Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).  The Federal Circuit has referred to claim 
language of this type as “functional language.”  Typhoon Touch, 659 F.3d at 1380. 
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C.  The Infringers’ Problem 
 
[63] Infringers of capability claims may find themselves in a bind 
because they have no efficient way to stop infringing.  Ordinarily, if a 
software-driven device infringes a patent solely by virtue of its software, a 
firmware update can deactivate the relevant software module and render 
the device noninfringing.  This is an efficient means of redress because it 
minimizes compliance costs that are unrelated to the infringement.  As an 
example, the infringer in Tivo v. Echostar attempted to deactivate the 
offending software module in its set-top receivers rather than physically 
confiscate the millions of devices that had entered the marketplace.154 
 
[64] But devices that infringe capability claims lack a clean and 
economical workaround.  Under Fantasy Sports, a firmware update is a 
non-structural modification because it does not add functionality that the 
device did not ship with.155  Any device that has been deactivated with a 
firmware update can be reactivated, and made infringing, by another 
firmware update.  Thus, even a device that has been deactivated by the 
manufacturer is still capable of infringing a capability claim.  The 
manufacturer then has to resort to less an efficient means of deactivation, 
up to and including physical confiscation from users, at its own potentially 
prohibitive expense. 
 
[65] To the extent that the potentially enormous costs of complying 
with capability claims outweigh any actual economic harm to the patentee, 
the patentee reaps a windfall, manifested as increased bargaining power in 
                                                           
154 See 646 F.3d 869, 878-79 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  The court affirmed a finding that the 
infringer, Echostar, was in contempt of a permanent injunction.  Id. at 890.  But the facts 
illustrate the technical and economic feasibility of remote firmware updates as a 
workaround for infringing software. 
 









licensing negotiations.  The economic threat of being forced into such a 
“hostage situation” will discourage rational potential market entrants, to 
the detriment of all participants in affected markets. 
 
D.  The Public Problem 
 
[66] Unsettled law is itself problematic just by virtue of being unsettled.  
This is not unique to patent law; throughout all areas of the law, affected 
parties make rational decisions based on the likely legal consequences of 
those decisions.  This is a calculus that demands that those legal 
consequences be predictable.  However, in patent law, where strong and 
reliable patent rights are a prerequisite of long-term, billion-dollar, 
industrial investments, the stakes are perhaps uniquely high.  Infringement 
of another’s exclusive patent rights can be remedied by permanent 
injunction—shutting down not only the infringing widget, but the 
infrastructure responsible for manufacturing, transporting, selling, and 
supporting that widget and ancillary products and services.156  An 
industrial actor’s confidence in manufacturing or selling a device is only 
as strong as its certainty that the device is not infringing another’s patent.  
Clear delineation of the scope of patent rights is essential to encouraging 
industrial action and investment, and to discouraging it from relocating 
beyond the jurisdiction of American patent laws.  To the extent that the 
law governing latent infringement renders patent claims of indeterminate 
scope, subject to the whims of district courts acting without clear 
guidance, the law must change to provide certainty. 
 
                                                           
156 This conversation is familiar from commentary surrounding the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision on permanent injunctive relief for patentees in eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).  See, e.g., Matthew Sag & Kurt W. 









IV.  THE SOLUTION 
 
[67] In the author’s opinion, that the latent infringement problem, 
unlike some other problems with the patent system, is not intractable.  The 
problem persists not because of irreconcilable policy goals, but because 
the key players in the patent system—the USPTO, the district courts, the 
Federal Circuit, the patentees, the accused infringers—have yet to devote 
sufficient attention to it.  If the bad news is that the present state of the law 
surrounding latent infringement subjects the patent system to random 
exogenous shocks, the good news is that the system already has tools in 
place to right the course.  
 
[68] If overbroad patent claims exist and wield economic power, 
responsibility falls on two institutions: the USPTO, which issues those 
claims; and the federal court system, which enforces the claims judicially.  
A solution to claim overbreadth must involve both the USPTO and the 
courts.  It would be insufficient just for the USPTO to stop issuing 
overbroad capability claims.  Since patents remain valid for twenty years 
following the date of issuance, overbroad capability claims that have 
already been issued will be enforceable until as late as 2033 unless the 
courts can narrow or invalidate those claims.157 
[69] Similarly, it would not suffice just for the court system to curtail 
overbroad capability claims, because only a small fraction of patent claims 
ever appear before a federal court.158  Patents convey economic power 
simply by existing.  If a patentee threatens to assert a claim against a 
putative infringer, the mere existence of that patent—representing the 
stamp of approval by the USPTO, and carrying a presumption of 
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validity—may substantiate the threat.159  This is particularly true for small 
or unsophisticated accusees, who may lack the ability to investigate the 
merits of infringement accusations or to gamble on vindication in court.  
Even absent any specific threat of litigation, the existence of a patent 
signals to the public that the patentee possesses exclusive rights to its 
subject matter.  Rational parties may simply elect to not enter a market 
space in which they face a threat, legitimate or not, of being litigated out 
of existence.  Even if the courts reform the treatment of overbroad 
capability claims in litigation, the USPTO must carry its burden of 
denying those claims entry into the patent system in the first place. 
 
A.  Front-End Solutions:Stop the USPTO From Granting 
Overbroad Capability Claims 
 
[70] The USPTO already has powerful and established tools for 
keeping overbroad claims out of the patent system: the enablement and 
written description requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, and the novelty 
requirements of § 102.  Examiners need to invoke these statutes 
consistently with respect to capability claims.  The challenge is twofold: 
(1) examiners need to recognize capability claims when they are proposed 
by applicants, and to acknowledge the potential scope of those claims 
under current law; and (2) examiners need to apply the statutes correctly to 
those claims. 
 
1.  Recognize and Acknowledge Capability Claims 
  
[71] With regard to the first prong, recognition and acknowledgement 
of capability claims, the USPTO administration has a role to play in 
educating examiners about capability language.  The USPTO is tasked 
with maintaining Title 37, Chapter 1 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(“37 C.F.R”), which is the subset of the C.F.R. that governs the patent 
                                                           









prosecution process.160  Additionally, the USPTO publishes the Manual of 
Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”), which details patent examination 
procedures.161  The USPTO administers the process by which patent 
attorneys, patent agents, and patent examiners are admitted to practice 
before the USPTO; this process charges all admittees with knowledge of 
the contents of the MPEP.162  Amending 37 C.F.R., the MPEP, or both to 
address the treatment of capability claim language would put all USPTO 
practitioners on notice.  Additionally, it would promote consistent 
treatment of similar claims, rather than subject the admissibility of a claim 
reciting capability to the whims of the randomly assigned patent examiner. 
 
[72] Exactly what such an update should say is another matter.  The law 
is thin on precisely what constitutes a capability claim, short of some form 
of the word “capability” in the claim itself.  In situations like this, where 
no single rule can cover all possible factual scenarios, introducing a 
presumption may be helpful.  I would propose that a claim that does not 
explicitly contain the word “capability,” or some close variation, 
presumptively does not claim a capability.  The onus is then on the claim 
drafter, should he or she intend to claim a capability rather than a present 
ability, to make that intention explicit in the claim language itself. 
 
[73] This would not be the first time that the USPTO has seen the 
introduction of a claim language presumption.  It has been done 
successfully in the past, albeit at the Federal Circuit’s initiative, with the 
adoption of so-called “transitional phrases”—language that identifies the 
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elements of a claim as a closed set or an open set.163  Unless the patentee 
demonstrates otherwise, elements of a claim are presumptively a closed 
set; the claim reads on devices that contain only those elements.  Claim 
drafters can elect to make this explicit by using the transitional phrase 
“consisting of” to separate the claim preamble from the claim elements.  
Claims of an open set are broader, because they read on all devices that 
contain those elements, even if additional elements are also present.  To 
presumptively claim an open set, the claim must introduce its elements 
with the transitional phrase “comprising”, or a close equivalent.164 
 
[74] The subtlety with which capability claim language can present 
itself merits a stronger presumption than that encapsulated by the 
transitional phrases.  In determining whether the enablement and written 
description requirements are met, the examiner compares the technology 
taught by the specification with the technology claimed by the patent.  
Similarly, in determining novelty, a prior art device must be compared 
with the claims to determine whether the device anticipates those 
claims.165  For comparison purposes, a prior art device is essentially a set 
of elements to be compared against a claimed set of elements.  It is 
impossible to compare two sets without considering whether the sets are 
open or closed.166  Thus, even without a presumption against claims 
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reciting an open set of elements, the patent examiner is forced to consider 
whether the claim recites an open set or a closed set, so the risk of the 
examiner accidentally treating a claim as an open set of elements is low.  
However, as the leading cases on capability claims demonstrate, whether a 
claim recites a capability or a present ability frequently goes overlooked. 
Examiners automatically treat claims as capabilities or present abilities 
without analyzing the issue.  The ex parte nature of the examination 
process, which lacks an interested party to argue for non-issuance of a 
claim, does not help matters any.167  A strong presumption against 
capability, such as one that applies to all claims that do not use a form of 
the actual word “capability,” would promote the vital function of insuring 
these claims against overbreadth. 
 
2.  Apply the Statutes Correctly to Those Claims 
 
[75] Regarding the second capability challenge facing the USPTO – 
properly rejecting capability claims that fail the statutory requirement—
the law is all but silent on when Section 112 or 102 bars patentability of 
capability claims.  While the patentability of capability claims is of course 
fact-specific and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, patent 
examiners could benefit from some rules of thumb informed by the nature 
of certain categories of technology.  The scientific and legal communities 
are urged to evaluate for the USPTO whether some technologies 
categorically cannot be patented with capability language.  Software, for 
example, may have such expansive functionality that any capability claim 
on software is presumptively not enabled. 
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B.  Back-end solutions: Allow district courts to invalidate or 
correct overbroad capability claims, or at least to protect 
putative infringers of those claims.  Utilize the new 
administrative review procedures of the Leahy-Smith Act. 
 
[76] Like the USPTO, district courts also have tools at their disposal to 
curb overbroad capability claims.  Compared to the USPTO, district courts 
are better situated to recognize capability claims and acknowledge their 
potential overbreadth.  Unlike the patent examiner who examines patent 
claims a priori, ex parte, in bulk, and on a compressed schedule, the 
district courts generally have the luxuries of hindsight, with which the 
overbreadth of a capability claim may have become apparent, and the 
adversarial process, by which accused infringers may conduct discovery 
and meaningfully argue against claim validity or infringement.168  But 
district courts must of course comply with Supreme Court and Federal 
Circuit precedent.  With this in mind, district courts that recognize 
overbroad capability claims have several options, as discussed below.  
 
1.  Invalidate the Claims on § 112 or § 102 Grounds 
 
[77] The USPTO can deny a claim on the grounds that the claim is not 
enabled under § 112 or anticipated under § 102; district courts can 
invalidate issued claims on those same grounds.169  Non-enablement and 
anticipation can probably be argued, as in the Revolution Eyewear and 
Finjan examples discussed supra, in opposition to many capability 
claims.170  Capability claims that are of potentially infinite scope are 
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unlikely to be enabled by the patents containing those claims.  
Additionally, many capability claims, due to their breadth, will probably 
encompass some prior art reference, and thus potentially be invalidated on 
§ 102 grounds.  The difficulty is in the evidentiary standard imposed by 
i4i; the USPTO is now afforded such deference that only on a showing of 
clear and convincing evidence can the court invalidate a claim that the 
USPTO has issued.171  But while the burden of proof is high, it is not 
insurmountable; the USPTO is still accountable for plain error in issuing 
patent claims.172  The dust has yet to settle on i4i, and it is unclear what 
the new evidentiary standard will mean in practice for patent validity.  
However, district court judges are urged to be aggressive in finding non-
enablement or anticipation of capability claims.173 
 
2.  Construe Even Seemingly Unambiguous Capability 
Language in Light of Intrinsic Evidence 
 
[78] District courts have only a limited ability to narrow claims based 
on the patent specification; in particular, the Federal Circuit instructs that 
limitations must not be imported from the specification to the claim.174  
Yet as demonstrated by Typhoon Touch, courts are authorized by Phillips 
v. AWH to examine sources beyond the literal claim language—most 
importantly, the patent specification and prosecution history—in order to 
construe claims in accordance with what the patentee actually invented.175  
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District courts are urged to look beyond the claim language, even when 
claims may superficially appear to have clear plain meaning.  For 
example, a claim of a device “capable of performing X” can be fairly seen 
as ambiguous.  Did the inventor mean “capable” in the Federal Circuit 
sense, where any device that can perform X without structural 
modification is “capable”?  Or did the inventor mean “capable” in a more 
colloquial sense, where the device is only conditionally, or in some 
specific way, able to perform X?  Rather than foreclose on this sort of 
claim language, as in Revolution Eyewear,176 courts are urged to find 
ambiguity in capability language and to construe that language in light of 
whether the record indicates that the inventor really intended the capability 
language to have the broad scope afforded it by the Federal Circuit.177 
 
3.  Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents 
 
[79] District courts have a rarely-invoked tool for finding 
noninfringement even though an accused device literally meets the claim 
limitations.  The so-called “reverse doctrine of equivalents” may have a 
role to play in rescuing devices that unfairly fall within the scope of a 
capability claim.178  In 1985, the Federal Circuit laid out the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents in SRI International v. Matsushita Electric 
Corporation of America: 
 
The law also acknowledges that one may only appear to 
have appropriated the patented contribution, when a product 
precisely described in a patent claim is in fact 'so far 
changed in principle' that it performs in a 'substantially 
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different way' and is not therefore an appropriation (reverse 
doctrine of equivalents).179 
 
[80] The “so far changed in principle” standard would likely be difficult 
to meet in situations where a device meets the claim limitations with 
merely a non-structural modification; in most cases, such devices will 
likely bear a substantial resemblance to the patented device and not 
perform “substantially different[ly].”180  For instance, consider the two 
fantasy football software programs in Fantasy Sports.  The two programs, 
which behaved similarly except for the particulars of their scoring 
mechanisms, differed in a way that went to the heart of the disputed 
“bonus points” limitation.181  However, a court would probably be hard-
pressed to find that the fantasy football program that lacks the “bonus 
points” scoring mechanism is “so far changed in principle” from the other 
program that the reverse doctrine of equivalents is appropriate—especially 
given the Federal Circuit’s apparent distaste for the doctrine.182  
Nevertheless, it is not impossible to imagine a capability claim asserted 
against a device that, while literally capable of performing the claimed 
functionality, behaves so fundamentally differently from the claimed 
device that application of the doctrine may be appropriate. District courts 
and defense counsel are urged to keep the doctrine in mind as device 
capabilities continue to evolve. 
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4.  New Administrative Review Procedures 
 
[81] Though beyond the scope of this Article, it bears mentioning that 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act provides for new avenues of inter 
partes review of issued patents.183  Interested parties are urged to be 
vigilant in raising issues of capability in these proceedings. 
 
C.  Long-term Solutions: Implement Reform at the Appellate 
or Legislative Level 
  
[82] It is not clear that the patent system actually benefits from 
extending special treatment to capability claims.  Special treatment for 
capability claims overlaps with third party infringement provisions and the 
doctrine of equivalents while adding nothing other than judicial confusion, 
uncertainty of industrial actors, and the risk of undue claim overbreadth. 
Legislation or judicial interpretation should force latent infringement to be 
handled under the current framework. 
 
[83] Patent law already has specific provisions for third party 
infringement, under which courts can properly take into account subjective 
factors, such as the third party’s intent.184  These subjective factors can 
meaningfully distinguish between those capabilities that should be treated 
as infringing present abilities and those that should not.  Cases such as 
High Tech Medical show the Federal Circuit struggling to shoehorn 
designers’ intent and other subjective factors into its §271(a) direct 
infringement analysis.185  Rather than engage in legal fiction, courts 
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should analyze latent infringement of capability claims under the third 
party infringement framework, with manufacturers of latent devices the 
potentially infringing third party rather than the direct infringer.  
 
[84] Additionally, a policy concern behind latent infringement doctrine 
is that present ability claims, if unable to read on latent configurations, are 
at risk of being underinclusive in scope.  However, such claims are already 
subject to literal broadening via the doctrine of equivalents.  The doctrine 
of equivalents extends the scope of a claim to subject matter that 
“performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to 
obtain the same result” as the claimed subject matter.186  Moreover, as 
resolved by the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton 
Davis Chemical Co., the question of equivalence is resolved at the time of 
infringement, not at the time the patent was issued.187  This ensures that 
the ability of a present ability claim to equivalently read on a latent 
configuration is not limited by the fact that the latent configuration may 
not have been known or foreseeable at the time of filing.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
[85] As technology increasingly challenges traditional notions of 
“capability,” the onus is on the patent system to adapt in ways that 
incentivize such technology while respecting the rights already extended 
to patentees.  The Federal Circuit has had recent opportunities to shape the 
law surrounding capability claims in cases like Finjan Software, Ltd. v. 
Secure Computing Corp., Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, 
Inc., and Typhoon Touch Technologies, Inc. v. Dell, Inc., but each time it 
has blinked.  Congress’ long-awaited revision of the patent law, the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, is silent on infringement and claim 
interpretation.  If the C.F.R. and the MPEP are any indication, the USPTO 
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and its corps of examiners remain oblivious to capability claim issues.  
When reform arrives, it may not be until after market forces have rendered 
the current law unsustainable.  
 
[86] The players in the patent system have an opportunity to get ahead 
of the curve and curb the scope of overbroad capability claims before 
opportunists—“trolls”—move in.  As discussed in this Article, under Title 
35, the USPTO and the Federal Courts have scoping tools at their 
disposal; they can and should begin using them today.  Should appellate or 
lawmaking bodies address the issue, they would perhaps be wise to clarify 
current doctrinal ambiguity by removing special treatment for capability 
claims in light of the existing framework for holding third parties liable for 
a user’s infringement, and for broadening literal claim scope via the 
doctrine of equivalents. 
 
 
